Capital Structure Volatility in Europe by Campbell, Gareth & Rogers, Meeghan
Capital Structure Volatility in Europe
Campbell, G., & Rogers, M. (2017). Capital Structure Volatility in Europe. International Review of Financial
Analysis. DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2017.11.008
Published in:
International Review of Financial Analysis
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/,which
permits distribution and reproduction for noncommercial purposes, provided the author and source are cited.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:04. Jan. 2018
1 
	
	
	
	
	
	
Capital Structure Volatility in Europe 
 
 
Gareth Campbell1 and Meeghan Rogers2 
	
 
Abstract 
 
Contrary to the predictions of the trade-off theory, we find that many companies in Europe had 
substantial variation in their capital structures between 2006 and 2016. We show that this 
pattern occurred across countries. Companies with the most volatile debt ratios tended to be 
smaller, and were less profitable. Their high debt volatility was partly due to high volatility in 
operating and investing activities, and partly due to a reduced propensity to let cash balances 
and equity payouts absorb the fluctuations. 
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I. Introduction 
According to the static trade-off theory, companies should have a target leverage ratio which 
balances the benefits and costs of debt. This would imply that firms should try to maintain a 
particular capital structure, and not deviate much from that level. However, recent research has 
found that many companies do not seem to pursue this approach. DeAngelo and Roll (2015) 
have opened a new direction in capital structure research, with their focus on the volatility of 
debt ratios over time, rather than on their levels. They have found that, in the United States, 
capital structure stability is the exception, not the rule.  
We begin by extending their analysis to Europe, focusing on the period from 2006 to 
2016. We examine companies based in the major markets of UK, Germany and France, and 
also include companies from the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) whose 
capital structures could potentially have been heavily affected by the Credit Crunch and 
Eurozone Crisis.  
We show that, although average debt ratios within countries generally did not change 
much, there were many companies which experienced substantial changes in their capital 
structure. We analyse what types of companies experienced the largest changes in debt levels, 
and which had the highest volatility. We find that small firms, and those with lower returns on 
assets, experienced the most volatility.  
The focus of DeAngelo and Roll (2015) is to demonstrate the surprising amount of debt 
instability, so they do not extensively examine the causes of this volatility. However, they do 
speculate that it might be related to the budget constraint. The concept of the budget constraint, 
whereby a firm's uses of funds must equal its sources of funds, has been discussed at least as 
far back as Miller and Modigliani (1961), and has also been used more recently by Fama and 
French (2012), and Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) in their explanations of why different 
corporate finance policies may interact. Lambrecht and Myers (2012) also use it to suggest that 
	
	
3 
	
if firms want to choose their level of capital expenditure and dividends, then they must allow 
debt to fluctuate as a residual.   
We build on this research to introduce the concept of the Corporate Finance Trilemma. 
A trilemma occurs when it is not possible to choose all policies simultaneously, and has been 
applied in the context of international finance by Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962). The 
Corporate Finance Trilemma arises because companies would like to choose their debt, cash 
holdings, and equity payout policies simultaneously, but they cannot. The primary source of 
value for a firm comes from Cash from Operating and Investing activities (CFOI). 
Nevertheless, companies also pay attention to other aspects of their financial situation, and 
would ideally like to be able to select optimal policies in all of these areas. However, there 
exists a cash-flow constraint which means that debt flows, changes in cash holdings, and equity 
payouts must sum to CFOI. The consequence of this is that companies cannot choose their 
optimal level of debt without it affecting other policies.  
We use the cash flow constraint to explain why some companies have reduced their 
debt, whilst others have increased it. We find that there is little difference between these 
companies in terms of cash from operations, dividends, equity issues or repurchases, but 
substantial differences in terms of investments. Firms which have reduced their debt tended to 
have low investments, whilst those which increased their debt most had much higher 
investments. 
We show that there is a wide distribution in how much volatility different companies 
allow in their debt flows. We demonstrate that the volatility of debt flows is partly determined 
by circumstance. Firms with low volatility in debt tend to also have relatively low volatility in 
most of the other cash flow components. However, debt volatility is also heavily influenced by 
the choices of the firm. Some companies prioritise debt stability, and do not allow debt to 
fluctuate in response to changes in CFOI. We show that the beta of debt to CFOI is almost zero 
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for companies with the lowest volatility. This means that equity payouts and changes in cash 
balances must respond to these fluctuations. Other companies give precedence to managing 
cash holdings and equity payouts, but this means that debt must absorb any changes, making it 
more volatile. Firms with a high debt volatility have a beta of debt to CFOI which is 
significantly higher, whilst their beta of equity payouts to CFOI, and changes in cash balances 
to CFOI, are significantly lower. 
This paper makes a substantial contribution beyond the existing research in this area. It 
moves beyond DeAngelo and Roll (2015) in several ways. Firstly, we consider Europe, and 
show that many companies changed their capital structures considerably, and that high debt 
volatility is common outside of the United States. Secondly, we explain why this occurred. We 
show that it arises because these companies have high cash flow volatility and because the 
companies have refused to let cash balances and equity payouts fluctuate enough to absorb this 
volatility. Thirdly, in contrast to DeAngelo and Roll (2015), we also emphasise that many other 
companies have very stable debt levels. We demonstrate that this is a result of low operating 
cash flow volatility and because the companies have allowed cash balances and equity payouts 
to absorb any volatility that does exist. 
Several other papers have noted that a budget constraint implies that there will be 
interaction between different corporate finance policies (Miller and Modigliani, 1961, Fama 
and French, 2012, Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan, 2010). Lambrecht and Myers (2012) use it to 
suggest that debt is likely to be treated as a residual. However, we move beyond this in several 
important ways. Firstly, we argue that for many companies it is actually debt which is kept 
stable, whilst other components are forced to act as the residual. This adjustment to the model 
makes it much more flexible in terms of explaining the spectrum of firm behaviour. Secondly, 
we develop a model in terms of variances and covariances, rather than levels, which provides 
a much greater insight into the interactions between the components of the budget constraint, 
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and allows the model to be analysed empirically. Thirdly, we test our model empirically and 
obtain novel results. We find that it is both operating and investing cash flow volatility and the 
response of firms which matter for debt volatility. We also find that it is smaller and riskier 
firms which are more likely to have higher debt volatility. 
This paper also helps to place the enduring debate about the static trade-off and pecking 
order theories within a broader framework. A large volume of research has found support for 
and against each theory. For example, Fama and French (2012) suggest that there is a target 
debt level but the movement towards it is sluggish. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) also 
argue that there are target leverage levels, as firms remained in similar bands of debt over two 
decades, whilst Byoun (2008) finds that target debt levels are present and that firms move 
towards this during times of a surplus or deficit. However, DeAngelo and Roll (2015) find little 
evidence of a target debt level. Previously, Graham and Harvey (2001) have also noted that 
only 10% of firms reported that they tried to maintain a very strict target ratio. De Jong et al. 
(2011) find that firms seem to use the pecking-order theory when they need to raise capital, but 
follow the trade-off theory when they reduce capital. They state that firms will issue debt to 
increase their leverage but when considering repurchase decisions, firms will repurchase 
equity.  
The variation in the literature suggests that there are some cases where there is a target 
debt level, and others where there is not. Fama and French (2005) note that both the trade-off 
and pecking order theories have serious problems, and put forth the idea that they could be 
complements to each other instead of two stand-alone theories. This paper concurs with this 
suggestion. It argues that some firms do maintain stable capital structures, possibly motivated 
by the trade-off approach. Other firms use debt extensively, possibly motivated by the pecking 
order theory cautioning against issuing external equity. However, these individual theories 
need to be combined into a much broader framework, to understand that the capital structure 
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of a firm will also be considerably affected by the volatility of its CFOI, and its optimal policies 
on cash balances and equity payouts. 
 
II. Data and Instability Results 
We collected firm-specific data from Bloomberg for companies domiciled in the UK, 
Germany, France and the PIIGS, between 2006 and 2016. We include all companies which had 
cash flow information available for each year of the sample period but, as is common in capital 
structure studies, financial firms were excluded. All variables from the cash-flow statement 
were included for each company for each year, and were scaled by total assets. The analysis 
focuses on the change and volatility of these variables over this period, so only those companies 
which had this data for the full sample period were included. The final sample consists of 1,422 
companies.  
Table 1 shows the average total debt to assets ratio, for each year, for each country. The 
UK stays generally around 16-17% for most of the sample but has an increase around the 
financial crisis. Similarly, France remains around 21%, with a small increase in 2008 to 23.4%. 
The results are similar for most of the countries in the sample, with a somewhat constant debt 
ratio with a small spike around the financial crisis. However, Greece’s total debt to assets ratio 
increases throughout the years of our sample from 30.9% in 2006 to 42.6% in 2016. Spain 
increases from 2006 until 2014 and then begins to fall.  
<< INSERT TABLE 1 >> 
Some examples of volatility in the capital structures of individual companies can be 
seen from Figure 1, which plots the total debt to assets ratios of two sample companies. For 
Danone, the total debt to assets ratio rises, falls, then fluctuates somewhat for a few years, 
another sharp increase. For ITV the debt ratio rises, falls and then rises again. 
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<< INSERT FIGURE 1 >> 
To assess the extent to which capital structures change, a methodology is used which is 
based on the approach of DeAngelo and Roll (2015), who analyse firms only from the United 
States. The capital structure of a company in the first year, 2006, is regressed against the capital 
structure of that company in year t+n. This gives an insight into how well values of the 
debt/asset ratio can explain future values. An R2 close to 1.0 would imply stable capital 
structures, with those companies with high debt at time t, also having high debt at t+n. The 
lower the R2 the lower the stability of capital structures. 
Figure 2 illustrates the R² from these regressions for our sample, using various values 
of n. Our results are similar to DeAngelo and Roll (2015). The average R² for year over year 
cross sections of debt after one year is around 0.70, implying high but not perfect stability in 
the short-term. However, the R² declines considerably as the time between t and t+n increases. 
A regression using the debt/asset ratios at time t to explain them at time t+10 has an R² of just 
0.22. This implies that over the longer term, there is substantial variation in the capital 
structures of many companies.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 >> 
In Table 2, companies are categorised according to their debt levels. The categories of 
companies in the first year, 2006, and the final year, 2016, are reported. There does appear to 
be some stability, particularly amongst companies which started with zero debt with just under 
half also having zero debt at the end of the sample period. However, the main picture is one of 
considerable changes. For those companies with 0.1% to 9.9% debt/assets at the start of the 
period, only 35% remain within this band at the end of the period. Companies which start with 
higher debt levels are generally unlikely to be within the same band after 10 years. 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 >> 
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It is possible that total changes in capital structures do not reflect volatility, so we go 
on to distinguish between total changes in debt and the standard deviation of annual debt 
changes. The latter can provide additional insights into a company’s debt policy. Firms with 
low debt volatility, regardless of whether debt is rising or falling, may be pursuing a deliberate 
policy. However, firms with high debt volatility are more likely to be viewing debt as a residual, 
filling in gaps when needed. In Table 3, we show that companies with moderate debt changes 
overall also tend to have the lowest debt volatility, whilst companies with the largest reductions 
and increases are more likely to have the highest debt volatility. However, the relationship is 
not always clear, with some companies which change debt doing it with low volatility, and 
some of those which keep it steady overall actually have high volatility. 
<< INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
This section has established that there is a wide spectrum of capital structure volatility 
within Europe. Whilst some companies do maintain very stable debt levels, others exhibit very 
substantial variations across time. 
 
 
III. Which Companies have Volatile Capital Structures? 
In this section we analyse which companies have changed their capital structures most. We 
begin by considering the differences amongst countries in the data sample. DeAngelo and Roll 
(2015) focused on the United States, and found considerable volatility. By expanding the 
sample to Europe, it can be seen that volatility is also prevalent in many other countries, as 
shown in Table 4. Panel A shows that companies in the UK, France and Germany, have a wide 
distribution in terms of overall changes in capital structure between 2006 and 2016. For 
example, 13.2% of firms in the UK reduced their debt/asset ratios by more than 15 percentage 
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points, whilst 16.6% of firms increased them by more than 15 percentage points. Similar trends 
can be seen across most countries, with some companies increasing and others decreasing their 
debts. Greece has relatively more companies which substantially increased their debt ratios, 
whilst Ireland and Portugal have more companies which reduced their debt ratios. This suggests 
very different experiences within the PIIGS. 
In terms of volatility, shown in Panel B, there also appears to be wide distributions, 
with each country having many companies which had very low volatility in their debts, whilst 
also having many companies which had very high volatility. Companies in France tended to be 
relatively less volatile, whilst companies in Spain and Ireland tended to be more volatile. 
Although Greece had many companies which increased their debts in absolute terms, this 
seems to have often occurred gradually, as they did not have particularly high volatility. 
<< INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
 It is also possible that characteristics of particular firms will play a role in capital 
structure volatility. In Table 5, the means of firm-specific variables are shown for different 
groups, according to the overall changes in their debt/assets ratio in Panel A, and according to 
their volatility in Panel B. We include the average total assets of the firm during the period 
between 2006 and 2016. Based on this, we also create a Small Size dummy variable, in line 
with Leary (2009) which equals 1 for those companies in the lowest two deciles according to 
the size of their assets. This aims to capture the difficulties which the smallest firms may have 
in accessing debt. 
 We also include a variable for the change in assets between 2006 and 2016, to examine 
which companies were growing their asset base most. We also include a variable for average 
revenue growth during this period. The Return on Assets is the average profits/assets ratio 
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during the same period. We also include dummy variables for industries based on their ICB 
classification. 
<< INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
 From Table 5, we can see that firms which reduced their debt most, or increased it 
most, tended to be smaller in terms of total assets than companies which did not change much 
overall. Related to this, we see that larger firms tend to also have the lowest volatility in their 
debt/assets ratio. This is consistent with DeAngelo and Roll (2015) and Graham and Harvey 
(2001) who find that debt stability is most frequent in large companies. However, notably, the 
dummy variable for the smallest 20% of companies does not appear to be significantly 
different, suggesting that this is not being driven by constraints on very small companies being 
able to raise debt. 
Companies which had the largest increases in debt, and the most volatile debt, also 
tended to have a greater change in assets during this period. They were also much less 
profitable, with the average return on assets actually being negative. Return on assets decreases 
from 2.42% in the Lowest volatility quintile to -1.00% in the Highest volatility quintile, 
suggesting that companies with strict debt are more profitable than those with volatile debt. 
Revenue growth also increases as debt volatility increases, moving from 9.75% in the first 
quintile to 22.58% in the fifth quintile.  
Tables 6 and 7 perform regressions using these variables to analyse which companies 
had the largest changes in debt, and the most capital structure volatility. There have been 
numerous studies of how such factors may affect the levels of corporate leverage, such as 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin (2011), but this is the first to establish the determinants of 
volatility in capital structures.  
<< INSERT TABLES 6 and 7 >> 
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Similar patterns are seen within the multivariate regressions as has been discussed 
based on sorts of the data. Companies with higher profitability, as measured by their Return on 
Assets, tended to reduce their debts, as shown in Table 6, and had lower volatility in their debts, 
as shown in Table 7. 
Size is not a predictor of overall changes in debt, but is a highly significant predictor of 
debt volatility. The smallest 20% of companies had significantly higher debt volatility, whilst 
companies with the largest assets had significantly lower volatility. When entering both 
together in a regression, the total assets remains significant. When controlling for other factors, 
it can be seen that companies with the largest increases in assets also had the most debt 
volatility. Utilities and French companies tended to have lower volatility. A dummy variable 
bringing together the PIIGS is not significant, reflecting the differences between companies 
within this group. 
This section has analysed which types of companies experience capital structure 
volatility. It has found that different characteristics of the firm, such as smaller size, and low 
return on assets are associated with lower debt volatility.  
The next question that arises is how these changes in debt were implemented, as they 
could arise either from changes in debt, or equity, or other liabilities. Furthermore, the changes 
in debt can be broken down into debt flows, which are reported on the cash flow statement, and 
those which are only reported on the balance sheet.  Fama and French (2005) have noted that 
changes in the balance sheet values of equity often do not correspond to the amount of equity 
which has been issued and repurchased as reported in the cash flow statement, with mergers 
and acquisitions being the most important cause of the discrepancy between the two statements. 
A similar discrepancy can arise in a reporting of debt changes. 
Table 8 decomposes the origins of assets in 2016 into whether they arose from the 
values of debt, equity and other liabilities in 2006, or changes in these components between 
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2006 and 2016. This is achieved by taking the absolute values of debt, equity and other 
liabilities in 2006 and scaling them by the total assets of the company in 2016. The changes in 
the absolute value of debt, equity and other liabilities between 2006 and 2016 were also 
calculated, and scaled by the total assets of the company in 2016. The sum of debt cash flows 
between 2006 and 2016 was obtained from the cash flow statement. The change in balance 
sheet only debt was then calculated as the total change in debt minus the sum of debt cash 
flows. These components were then also scaled by total assets in 2016.  
Companies were then split into categories based on how much their debt/assets ratio 
changed during the sample period. It can be seen from Table 8, that the companies with the 
largest reductions in their debt/assets ratio started with a relatively high amount of debt, but 
then reduced this debt over time, both in terms of balance sheet only debt and debt cash flows. 
At the same time, the value of equity rose. These two factors combined led to substantial 
reductions in their debt/assets ratio. The reverse is true for companies with large increases in 
their debt/assets ratio.  
The various components can be combined to analyse the starting debt ratios, the final 
debt ratios, and then a theoretical calculation of what the final debt ratio would have been if 
there had been zero debt flows. Table 8 suggests that the group with the largest reduction in 
their leverage would have reduced their debt/assets ratio from 42.9% to 29.1%, just from 
changes in equity and balance sheet only debt. However, debt cash flows were also important, 
and reduced the final debt/assets ratio to an average of 15.4%. This suggests that changes in 
capital structure were driven by a range of factors, but that companies repaid a substantial 
amount of debt as part of this. 
<< INSERT TABLE 8 >> 
The reverse pattern emerges for companies which substantially increased their 
leverage. They would have increased their debt/assets ratios anyway, from 15.7% to 31.2%, 
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due to just changes in equity and other liabilities, but debt cash flows played a major role as 
well, raising the debt/assets ratio further to 47.5%. Changes in capital structure were therefore 
driven by several other changes, but debt flows played a central role. In the next sections we 
will analyse these debt flows in more detail, the different sources and uses of funds within a 
company, and how this is connected with the use of debt. 
 
IV. Debt Flows 
Most literature on capital structure policy focuses solely on debt, and target debt levels. 
However, Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) point out that it is not possible to look at only 
one corporate finance policy without looking at the others. Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) stress 
the importance of considering the interdependence of capital structure and dividend policy in 
their study of the impact of multinationality on debt levels. Lambrecht and Myers (2012) state 
that companies are likely to have a policy on their investment, and once this is fixed any 
fluctuations would have to be absorbed by dividends or debt. Due to the risk-averse nature of 
managers and habit formation, companies will try to smooth dividends, so the only remaining 
variable to change is debt.  They propose this as a general theory, implying that it explains the 
behaviour of most companies. However, in this research we find that different companies 
pursue different approaches. There are cases where debt is kept stable, but in others they are 
allowed to vary substantially.  
The sources and uses of cash can be seen from cash flow statements. These are split 
into activities involving operations, investing and financing. Operations involve cash earned 
by the company through its business dealings. Investment can involve capital expenditure, 
acquisitions, and other short-term and long-term investments. Financing involves flows to and 
from shareholders in terms of dividends, share repurchases and issues, and debt flows.  
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In Table 9 we breakdown how each component of the cash flow statement changed, 
when companies are split according to their average debt flows during this period. Cash from 
Operations does not seem to vary much between those companies with the largest debt 
outflows, and those with the largest debt inflows. The investing activities are split into three 
types, and in each of these the companies which raised the most debt were those which had 
spent most on investments. Those companies with the largest debt inflows spent an average of 
2.4% of assets, per year, more on fixed and intangible assets, 0.6% more on acquisitions, and 
2.2% more on other investments, than those companies with the largest debt outflows. Put 
together, the Cash from Operating and Investing Activities was positive for those companies 
with the most debt outflows, and negative for companies with the most debt inflows, producing 
a significant difference of 5.3% of assets per year between these groups.  
<< INSERT TABLE 9 >> 
Companies which raised the most debt also increased their cash balances more, by 0.6% 
of assets per year more than those which paid off their debts. They also tended to payout more 
in terms of dividends and equity repurchases. These companies did raise more from equity 
issues, but it was not close to being enough to cover the additional cash outflows which they 
had.  
Table 9 groups together several components to highlight the main drivers of debt flows. 
The Cash from Operating and Investing Activities is the amount of cash left from the main 
value creating decisions of the company. This will then be used to change cash holdings, make 
equity payouts, or for debt flows. This equation can be written as in Equation 1.  
CFOI  +   dCash   + EqPay   +   dDebt = 0 (1) 
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Where:    
CFOI  = Cash from Operating and Investing Activities 
 
EqPay = Dividends + Equity Repurchases + Equity Issues + Other Finance 
 
dCash = Change in Cash Balances 
 
dDebt  = Debt Flows 
 
A company cannot choose their desired level for each component of equity payouts, changes 
in cash holdings, and debt flows, as there would be no balancing variable to adjust the equation 
to follow CFOI.  To focus on more detail on debt, we can re-arrange the equation to become: 
 
CFOI  +   dCash   + EqPay   =  ‐dDebt  (2) 
 
From Table 9 we can see that differences in debt flows originates mainly from differences in 
CFOI (5.3%), but is exacerbated by changes in cash balances (0.6%), with differences in equity 
payouts having almost no impact (0.1%). Given the cash flow constraint, this gap had to be 
filled by changes in debt. Companies which had run up a large deficit had to borrow to cover 
it, whilst those which ran a surplus used it to pay off debts. The difference in debt flows between 
those which had the largest debt inflows, and those which had the largest debt outflows, was 
5.9% of assets per year.  
Examining average changes in each cash flow component can show how the policies 
are interlinked. However, it is not clear from such an approach which components are being 
chosen, and which are treated as a residual. Focusing on the volatility of each component, and 
its co-movement with other components, may help to provide more insights. Policies which 
are deliberately chosen are more likely to have low volatility, and be unresponsive to CFOI. In 
contrast, when a component is a residual it is likely to have higher volatility, and move to 
absorb changes in CFOI. 
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If an optimal debt policy is being pursued then debt flows would likely have low 
volatility, and would not fluctuate just because of changes in CFOI. In contrast, if debt is treated 
as a residual then it is likely to have high volatility, and co-move with CFOI to absorb 
fluctuations. To analyse the instability of debt flows we can take the cash flow constraint 
described in Equation 2, and use the rules of variances to show that: 
 
varሺdDebtሻ   = varሺCFOIሻ  +  varሺdCashሻ  +   varሺEqPayሻ 
+ 2covሺCFOI,	dCashሻ + 2covሺCFOI,	EqPayሻ + 2cov(dCash, EqPay)	
 
(3) 
Equation 3 shows that the variance of a company’s debt flows depends on the variance of CFOI, 
changes in cash holdings and equity payouts, and the covariance between these components. If 
cash balances are increased (seen as an outflow of cash to reserves), when CFOI inflows 
increase, this will absorb some of the volatility, and reduce the variance of debt flows. 
Similarly, if equity payouts increase (seen as outflow of cash to shareholders) when CFOI 
inflows increase, this will also reduce the variance of debt flows. If there is a negative 
covariance between changes in cash holdings and equity payouts, meaning that when one 
increases the other decreases, this would also tend to reduce the variance of debt flows. 
 The variance of debt flows will therefore depend on the variance of other components, 
and how these other components interact. As the components are connected, it is not possible 
for each policy to be chosen, as at least one must be left to fluctuate to absorb other changes. 
If a company wants to choose equity payouts and cash holdings, rather than just let them 
fluctuate with CFOI, then this will tend to increase debt volatility. If the company wants to 
choose a particular amount of debt and cash holdings, then equity payouts must fluctuate. If 
the company chooses debt and equity payouts, then it is cash holdings which must fluctuate.  
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We refer to this situation as the Corporate Finance Trilemma. If a company maintains 
a strict policy on debt, then some other components must become relatively more volatile. If a 
company has a strict policy regarding the other components of the cash flow statement, equity 
payouts and changes in cash holdings, then debt will act as the balancing variable that will 
increase or decrease according to the changes in CFOI. Companies would like to choose each 
policy, but they cannot maintain all policies simultaneously. 
 There are a number of reasons why companies would want to choose policies for each 
of the variables. It should be noted throughout this discussion that companies which have zero 
dividends, zero repurchases, zero issues or zero debt are still choosing to keep these 
components fixed, and are not allowing them to absorb any of the fluctuations in CFOI or other 
variables. 
Some companies will want to choose an optimal level of cash holdings, rather than 
simply letting it fluctuate with profits. Companies may not want to build up cash as this would 
lead to very low, or zero, rates of return (Masulis and Trueman, 1988). Excess cash could also 
lead to agency problems (Jensen, 1986). Some companies that have built up excessive amounts 
of cash have been targeted by activist investors, who regard these cash holdings as being 
inefficient. 
Other companies select what they regard as an optimal level of equity payouts, and do 
not make dividends, share repurchases and equity issues fluctuate exactly with CFOI. Although 
Miller and Modigiliani (1961) argue that dividends are irrelevant to firm value, Lintner (1956) 
found that companies generally try to ensure that dividends only change gradually, if at all. 
Leary and Michaely (2011) state that managers attempt to maintain a stable dividend policy, 
as it is generally regarded favourably by the market. Certain shareholders in high tax-brackets 
will want a zero dividend payout to avoid paying more taxes (Copeland et al., 2005).  
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If the company relied on repurchases to absorb the changes in CFOI, they would tend 
to make repurchases in times of good performance. Companies may try to keep repurchases 
close to zero, as they do not want to have to buy back shares that are overpriced. Another reason 
to keep repurchases fixed is that it could reduce the asset base of the company which in turn 
would have a negative effect on bondholders as there is less collateral (Copeland et al., 2005).  
Others may want to maintain zero equity issues, based on the pecking order theory. If 
managers have inside information, and work in the best interests of existing shareholders, they 
will tend to issue equity only when they believe it is overpriced. As investors are aware of this 
situation, they may regard an equity issue as a bad signal, meaning that share prices will decline 
and the equity issue is unsuccessful (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
  There are certain companies who will not want to have debt just co-move with profits. 
Some companies may prefer to maintain what they regard as an optimal debt level, which 
balances the tax shield (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) against the additional financial distress 
costs, which gives rise to the static trade-off theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). In line 
with static trade-off theory, Bonaime et al. (2014) note that firms will repurchase shares to 
reach this optimal leverage.  Strebulaev and Yang (2013) also show that a substantial number 
of firms maintain zero debt, whilst Dang (2013) finds that many firms in the UK also maintain 
zero leverage, either because they are constrained in their ability to raise debt, or because they 
want to maintain flexibility whereby they could raise debt in future if it was needed for 
investment. 
 Although firms would like to choose all policies simultaneously, they cannot due to the 
Corporate Finance Trilemma. This means that companies cannot maintain their optimal cash, 
equity payout and debt policies at the same time. At least one must be allowed to fluctuate to 
absorb changes in CFOI. 
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 It is also possible that constraints on individual components of the Trilemma, rather 
than choice, play a role. The most important constraint is likely to be the ability of some firms, 
possibly smaller firms, to issue new debt or equity. Companies with already high debt may also 
find it difficult to raise more debt, whilst the other extreme, firms with no debt will not be able 
to let debt fluctuate downwards. Similarly, companies with zero dividends or repurchases will 
not be able to cut them any further. Therefore these variables may be set due to either choice 
or constraint. Regardless of why they remain stable, the consequence remains the same, some 
other component of the Trilemma must act as the residual and will have to fluctuate more to 
absorb changes in CFOI. 
 
V. Corporate Finance Trilemma Results 
In this section we use the Corporate Finance Trilemma to explain why some companies have 
very high debt volatility, whilst others have very low debt volatility. We argue that the 
differences between firms depends partly on circumstance, due to the volatility of CFOI, and 
partly on the choices of the firm as to whether they will allow cash balances and equity payouts 
to absorb this volatility.  
We begin by examining the circumstance of each company. We split companies into 
five quintiles, depending on the standard deviation of each company’s debt flows from 2006 to 
2016. Quintile 1 consists of companies with the lowest volatility which show little movement, 
and Quintile 5 has the highest volatility. We then calculate the average across firms, within 
each quintile, of the standard deviation of each component of the cash flow statement, as shown 
in Table 10. 
<< INSERT TABLE 10 >> 
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There is a clear indication that companies with higher debt volatility also have higher 
volatility in most other components. Companies in quintile 5 not only have significantly higher 
volatility of debt flows, they also have significantly higher volatility in cash from operations, 
investments in fixed and intangible assets, cash from acquisitions and divestitures, and other 
investments. The higher debt volatility therefore partly arises from the operating and 
investment environment of the firm. 
However, it should be noted that choice is also important. For example, companies in 
quintile 1, which have the lowest debt volatility, actually have much higher volatility in CFOI 
than quintile 2. Nevertheless, due to the policies of the firms, this volatility gets absorbed by 
other components of the Trilemma, and debt volatility is kept low. 
To analyse the choices of companies, we examine in more detail how different 
components of the Trilemma respond to CFOI. We run separate regressions examining the 
relationship between CFOI and debt flows, CFOI and equity payouts, and CFOI and changes 
in cash balances, as shown in Table 11. Due to the cash flow constraint the betas from these 
regressions must sum to 1, as CFOI must be used in one of these ways. To examine differences 
between groups, we include a dummy variable for each quintile based on the standard deviation 
of their debt flows. For example, DummySDDebt5 is a dummy variable for those companies 
which have the most volatile debt flows, DummySDDebt4 has the next most volatile etc. We 
then interact these dummies with the CFOI variable. This interaction term will reveal 
differences between quintiles in terms of how they respond to changes in CFOI. We also 
include dummy variables for companies based on their size, their debt levels, and whether they 
paid a dividend or made repurchases in the previous year, as these may constrain their ability 
to let some variables fluctuate with CFOI.  
<< INSERT TABLE 11 >> 
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The results suggest that for the base group, the companies with the lowest debt 
volatility, there is almost no connection between debt flows and CFOI with a beta of just 0.037. 
In contrast the beta of equity payouts and CFOI is 0.517, and the beta of changes in cash 
balances and CFOI is 0.446. This suggests that companies with low debt volatility are choosing 
to keep debt stable, but this means that equity payouts and cash balances must fluctuate. 
The interaction term between CFOI and DummySDDebt2 shows that these companies 
have a significantly higher beta on the relationship between debt and CFOI, suggesting that 
debt begins to respond more. This pattern continues for Quintiles 3, 4 and 5, each of which 
shows a further significant increase on the debt beta. The implied beta between debt and CFOI 
for Quintile 5 is 0.408 (=0.037+0.371), showing that debt absorbs much of the changes in CFOI 
for this group of companies which have high debt volatility. 
The opposite pattern emerges with the beta on the relationship between equity payouts 
and CFOI, and between changes in cash balances and CFOI. These betas are significantly lower 
for companies with higher debt volatility, showing that as debt becomes more responsive, 
equity payouts and cash balances become less so. 
The results on the dummy variables for possible constraints are also informative. They 
suggest that the smallest companies, based on the previous year’s total assets, actually have 
lower debt outflows than others, after controlling for CFOI and other variables. This suggests 
they are not under pressure to pay back debts, and are not heavily constrained in terms of raising 
debt or rolling over existing debt. Companies which already had high debt levels tend to make 
higher debt repayments, but lower equity payouts, which could possibly illustrate that they are 
unable or unwilling to raise more debt. Companies with low debt levels did the reverse, 
possibly due to the constraint of some of these companies facing a lower bound of zero on their 
debt levels and not being able to reduce debt further. Companies which did not pay a dividend, 
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or make repurchases, in the previous year, tended to have lower equity payouts in the current 
year, but made higher debt repayments.  
The results in this section suggest that the volatility of debt flows partly depends on 
circumstance, meaning the volatility of other cash flow components as shown in Table 10, and 
partly on choice, meaning the approach of the company in terms of whether it treats debt as a 
residual which can be used to absorb changes in CFOI, as shown in Table 11. 
To show the sources of debt volatility we report the components of Equation 4, broken 
down by quintile, in Table 12. Companies with low debt flow variance also tend to have fairly 
low variance in terms of CFOI (1.0%), equity payouts (0.9%) and cash holdings (1.3%). The 
covariance between these components is such that it absorbs almost all of the variance that 
does exist. Cash holdings are most responsive, moving along with CFOI, reducing the variance 
of debt by 1.4%. Equity payouts also move with CFOI, reducing the variance of debt by a 
further 0.6%. Cash holdings also moves in the opposite direction to equity payouts, meaning 
that as one increases, the other decreases, and debt flows are not needed to fund both of them 
simultaneously, reducing the variance of debt by another 1.2%. Put together, this can explain 
why these firms have such a low variance of debt flows, at 0.0% to one decimal place. 
<< INSERT TABLE 12 >> 
For Quintile 2, it is interesting to note that the variance of CFOI (0.5%), EqPay (0.3%), 
and dCash (0.4%) are much lower. However, the covariances absorb much less, resulting in a 
higher variance of debt flows. This suggests that these companies have more benign 
circumstances, but they have not chosen to target debt stability as rigorously as Quintile 1. 
Similar patterns emerge for Quintiles 3 and 4, which also have low variance in CFOI, EqPay 
and dCash, but due to their choices in terms of how to absorb this volatility, they end up with 
higher debt volatility. 
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These results stand in contrast to companies with flexible capital structures, who have 
much more volatile circumstances. Breaking down the variances and covariances in line with 
Equation 4 again reveals how these factors interact to produce high debt volatility. The variance 
of CFOI is much higher at 2.2%, and there have also been some increases in the variance of 
cash holdings to 1.1%, and equity payouts to 1.3%. The covariances between the components 
show us if they are moving together to absorb this volatility. We can see that the comovement 
of cash holdings and CFOI are absorbing only 1.1% of this variance. The covariance of CFOI 
and equity takes up a further 1.0%, whilst the covariance of cash holdings and equity deals 
with another 1.0%. The remainder has to be absorbed by debt, and the variance of debt flows 
for these firms is 1.5%.   
A comparison between the High and Low volatility quintiles shows significant 
differences both in terms of circumstance and choice. Put together, the variances are much 
higher. Covariances absorb little of the extra volatility, meaning that debt flows must fluctuate 
considerably to cover the gaps. 
In summary, the results above suggest that the Corporate Finance Trilemma can help 
to explain patterns in debt volatility. Cash from Operating and Investing activities is the main 
source of value to a company, but the secondary decisions of which variable to act as a residual 
to these fluctuations must also be considered. Some companies will choose to keep debt stable, 
but when a company chooses to focus on cash holdings and equity payout policy it leaves little 
room to also have a strict policy on their debt. The high debt volatility companies are not 
allowing cash holdings and equity payouts to fluctuate enough in line with CFOI, or each other, 
so debt flows must act as a residual. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
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The empirical results presented in this paper confirm, using data on European companies, that 
although some firms do maintain strict capital structures, there are many others which allow 
their capital structures to move substantially over time. Companies with the most volatile debt 
tend to be smaller and less profitable. The cash flow constraint was used to illustrate that 
companies which raised debt tended to have been spending much more on investments. 
The theory of the Corporate Finance Trilemma, put forward in this paper, argues that 
due to the cash flow constraint firms cannot choose their ideal policies for equity payouts, cash 
holdings and debt simultaneously. Some companies will prefer to maintain a stable debt level, 
but they must then allow some other variables to fluctuate. Other companies may prefer to 
pursue optimal policies in equity payouts and cash holdings, but they must then accept high 
volatility in debt. 
The concept of the Trilemma was then used to explain why some companies have stable 
capital structures, whilst others are much more flexible. Firms with strict capital structures 
generally have low volatility in Cash from Operating and Investing activities, and any variance 
that does exist is absorbed, by changes in cash holdings and equity payouts, meaning that debt 
can remain very stable. In contrast, firms with flexible capital structures have high volatility in 
CFOI which is not absorbed by changes in cash or equity payouts, meaning that debt must act 
as the residual and become highly volatile.  
These results suggest that corporations cannot simply set their capital structures in 
isolation. Some companies will prioritise stable debt levels, but they must then accept 
fluctuations in other variables. Other companies will give precedence to equity payouts and 
cash holdings, and they resolve the Corporate Finance Trilemma by allowing debt to move 
more flexibly. 
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Figure 1 
Examples of Leverage Ratios: 2006 to 2016 
 
The debt ratio is measured by the total debt to total assets ratio. Data is obtained from Bloomberg.   
 
Panel A: Danone 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: ITV 
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Figure 2 
R2 from Regressing Capital Structures in 2006 against Future Years  
 
The figure shows the R² from a regression of capital structure in 2006 against capital structure in other years. 
Capital structure is measured by the total debt to total assets ratio. 
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Table 1 
Total Debt/Assets Ratio by Country and Year 
 
The debt ratio is measured by the total debt to total assets ratio. The average for each year is given, per year, for each country in the sample. 
   Average Total Debt/Assets Ratio 
 Companies per year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
UK 463 17.5 19.0 20.2 19.0 16.9 16.3 16.1 16.5 17.4 18.7 18.9 
France 296 21.1 21.6 23.4 22.5 21.1 21.0 20.9 20.6 20.9 21.5 22.2 
Germany 277 21.0 21.7 23.0 23.1 21.0 20.5 20.7 21.2 20.8 21.4 21.0 
Italy 138 24.9 25.2 27.3 28.2 28.0 29.6 29.0 29.4 28.4 28.8 28.2 
Greece 119 30.9 31.9 34.9 34.6 36.2 38.1 38.8 39.5 39.7 41.7 42.6 
Spain 61 28.6 27.9 30.6 33.1 32.8 33.2 33.5 34.9 35.4 34.5 32.7 
Ireland 38 22.9 19.5 23.0 22.8 23.0 20.3 21.3 21.4 20.1 19.5 17.4 
Portugal 30 39.8 39.3 43.1 43.7 41.2 43.5 44.1 37.1 39.2 38.8 37.2 
             
Total 1422 21.9 22.5 24.4 23.9 22.6 22.6 22.6 22.8 23.0 23.8 23.8 
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Table 2 
Total Debt/Assets in 2006 and 2016 
 
Companies have been split into categories based on their debt/assets ratio in 2006. The percentage of companies in each category which had a given debt/assets ratio in 2016 
is then shown. 
 
  Debt/Assets in 2016   
  0% 0.1-9.9% 10-19.9% 20-29.9% 30-39.9% 40-49.9% >50% Total Number of Companies 
Debt/Assets 
in 2006 0% 44.2% 29.2% 10.6% 7.1% 1.8% 1.8% 5.3% 100.0% 113 
 0.1-9.9% 13.6% 35.6% 26.5% 13.6% 6.0% 2.2% 2.5% 100.0% 317 
 10-19.9% 6.6% 21.4% 27.6% 27.9% 7.9% 4.5% 4.1% 100.0% 290 
 20-29.9% 1.1% 17.3% 17.6% 27.1% 22.9% 7.4% 6.7% 100.0% 284 
 30-39.9% 1.9% 4.3% 11.6% 29.5% 26.1% 14.0% 12.6% 100.0% 207 
 40-49.9% 0.9% 3.7% 10.2% 18.5% 30.6% 13.9% 22.2% 100.0% 108 
 >50% 1.9% 6.8% 11.7% 9.7% 17.5% 22.3% 30.1% 100.0% 103 
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Table 3: 
Total Changes in Capital Structure vs Volatility of Capital Structures  
 
Companies have been split into categories based on the overall change in their capital structure between 2006 and 2016. Companies which reduced their capital structures by 
15% or more are in the first group, those which reduced by 5% to 15% are in the second group (b), those which reduced or increased by less than 5% are in the third group (c), 
those which increased by 5% to 15% are in the fourth group (d), and those which increased by more than 15% are in the final group. The companies are also grouped according 
to the standard deviation of their capital structures between 2006 and 2016, with companies split into quintiles with approximately equal numbers of companies in each quintile. 
The percentage of companies with a given change in capital structure and volatility is reported. 
 
  Volatility of Capital Structures  
  Lowest m n o Highest Total 
Changes in 
Capital 
Structures 
Reductions 11.1% 15.8% 19.5% 20.5% 33.2% 100.0% 
b 17.6% 28.9% 14.6% 21.8% 17.2% 100.0% 
c 37.7% 18.2% 17.8% 15.3% 11.0% 100.0% 
d 11.6% 28.5% 27.8% 18.0% 14.1% 100.0% 
Increases 4.6% 7.6% 21.1% 29.5% 37.1% 100.0% 
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Table 4 
Changes in Capital Structure and Volatility of Capital Structures by Country 
In Panel A, companies have been split into categories based on the overall change in their capital structure between 
2006 and 2016. Companies which reduced their capital structures by 15% or more are in the first group, those 
which reduced by 5% to 15% are in the second group (b), those which reduced or increased by less than 5% are 
in the third group (c), those which increased by 5% to 15% are in the fourth group (d), and those which increased 
by more than 15% are in the final group. The percentage of companies in each country which have a given change 
in capital structure is then shown. In Panel B, companies are grouped according to the standard deviation of their 
capital structures between 2006 and 2016, with companies split into quintiles with approximately equal numbers 
of companies in each quintile. The percentage of companies in each country which have a given volatility in their 
capital structures is then shown. 
 Panel A: Changes in Capital Structure 
 Reductions b c d Increases Total Number 
UK 13.2% 15.8% 36.3% 18.1% 16.6% 100% 463 
France 9.8% 16.9% 38.9% 22.6% 11.8% 100% 296 
Germany 15.9% 19.1% 30.7% 20.2% 14.1% 100% 277 
Italy 9.4% 22.5% 23.2% 25.4% 19.6% 100% 138 
Greece 16.0% 10.9% 24.4% 15.1% 33.6% 100% 119 
Spain 14.8% 19.7% 23.0% 18.0% 24.6% 100% 61 
Ireland 21.1% 13.2% 50.0% 13.2% 2.6% 100% 38 
Portugal 23.3% 6.7% 33.3% 26.7% 10.0% 100% 30 
 Panel B: Volatility of Capital Structures 
 Lowest m n o Highest Total Number 
UK 17.9% 15.1% 21.2% 22.7% 23.1% 100% 463 
France 22.3% 26.7% 24.0% 15.2% 11.8% 100% 296 
Germany 21.3% 23.1% 17.3% 17.0% 21.3% 100% 277 
Italy 17.4% 20.3% 21.7% 25.4% 15.2% 100% 138 
Greece 22.7% 16.8% 16.0% 26.1% 18.5% 100% 119 
Spain 16.4% 19.7% 18.0% 14.8% 31.1% 100% 61 
Ireland 26.3% 13.2% 13.2% 13.2% 34.2% 100% 38 
Portugal 20.0% 20.0% 10.0% 23.3% 26.7% 100% 30 
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Table 5 
Firm-Specific Factors Explaining Changes in Capital Structure, 
and Volatility of Capital Structure 
 
In Panel A, companies have been split into categories based on the overall change in their debt/asset ratios between 
2006 and 2016. Companies which reduced their capital structures by 15% or more are in the first group, those 
which reduced by 5% to 15% are in the second group (b), those which reduced or increased by less than 5% are 
in the third group (c), those which increased by 5% to 15% are in the fourth group (d), and those which increased 
by more than 15% are in the final group. In Panel B, companies are grouped according to the standard deviation 
of their debt/asset ratios between 2006 and 2016, with companies split into quintiles with approximately equal 
numbers of companies in each quintile. The average of variables, across companies within each category, is then 
reported. Small Size is a dummy variable for companies in the lowest two deciles when ranked according to 
average total assets between 2006 and 2016, similar to Leary (2009). Total Assets is the average assets of 
companies between 2006 and 2016. Change in Assets is calculated as the assets in 2016 minus assets in 2006, 
scaled by assets in 2006. Return on Assets is the average profit/assets ratio between 2006 and 2016. Revenue 
Growth is the average annual sales growth of companies, expressed in percentages, between 2006 and 2016. 
Variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Dummy variables are created for firms in companies which 
are classified as operating in the following ICB industries: Industrials, Utilities or Technology. All data is obtained 
from Bloomberg. For Panel A the difference between the quintiles with the largest reductions and increases is 
calculated, and the significance of t-tests is reported. For Panel B the difference between the quintiles with the 
highest and lowest volatility is calculated, and the significance of t-tests is reported. 
 Panel A: Change in Debt/Assets between 2006 and 2016    
 Largest Reduction b c d 
Largest 
Increase 
 Diff Sig.of Diff 
Small Size 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.14 0.23  0.03  
Total Assets 2,354.24 4,699.07 3,972.11 7,691.15 1,619.13  -735.11  
Change in Assets 1.13 0.92 1.28 1.35 1.70  0.57 * 
Return on Assets 2.66 3.01 2.05 2.90 -0.51  -3.17 *** 
Revenue Growth 15.42 11.15 14.44 9.83 19.05  3.63  
Dummy Industrials 0.35 0.23 0.33 0.37 0.24  -0.11 ** 
Dummy Utility 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02  0.01  
Dummy Technology 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.14  0.07 ** 
         
 Panel B: Volatility of Debt/Assets between 2006 and 2016    
 Lowest m n o Highest  Diff Sig. of Diff. 
Small Size 0.22 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.25  0.03  
Total Assets 5,473.89 5,749.74 4,204.95 3,149.40 2,561.33  -2912.56 ** 
Change in Assets 1.13 1.07 1.19 1.39 1.64  0.50 ** 
Return on Assets 2.42 3.12 3.33 2.30 -1.00  -3.42 *** 
Revenue Growth 9.75 11.02 10.28 15.70 22.58  12.83 *** 
Dummy Industrials 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.29  -0.01  
Dummy Utility 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02  -0.02  
Dummy Technology 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.12  -0.03  
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Table 6 
Regressions Explaining Changes in Total Debt/Assets Ratio 
Between 2006 and 2016 
 
The dependent variable is the change in the company’s total debt/assets ratio between 2006 and 2016. Small Size 
is a dummy variable for companies in the lowest two deciles when ranked according to average total assets 
between 2006 and 2016, similar to Leary (2009). Total Assets is the average assets of companies between 2006 
and 2016. Change in Assets is calculated as the assets in 2016 minus assets in 2006, scaled by assets in 2006. 
Return on Assets is the average profit/assets ratio between 2006 and 2016. Revenue Growth is the average annual 
sales growth of companies, expressed in percentages, between 2006 and 2016. Variables are winsorised at the 1% 
and 99% levels. Dummy variables are created for firms which are classified as operating in the following ICB 
industries: Industrials, Utilities or Technology. Dummy variables are also created for companies domiciled in 
France, Germany, or the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), with UK being the base group. All 
data is obtained from Bloomberg. Significance at 1% is denoted by ***, 5% by **, and 10% by *.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Small Size 0.520     -1.826 
 (1.358)     (1.483) 
TotAssets  -0.000    0.000 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
ChangeAssets  0.391    0.703** 
  (0.281)    (0.309) 
ROA   -0.416***   -0.494*** 
   (0.093)   (0.100) 
SalesGrowth   -0.005   -0.021 
   (0.019)   (0.019) 
Industrials    -1.067  0.181 
    (1.087)  (1.077) 
Utilities    3.235*  2.886* 
    (1.796)  (1.745) 
Technology    2.232  3.094* 
    (1.579)  (1.638) 
France     0.013 0.234 
     (1.211) (1.217) 
Germany     -1.256 -0.660 
     (1.379) (1.386) 
PIIGS     3.142** 3.289** 
     (1.389) (1.385) 
Constant 1.664*** 1.279** 2.671*** 1.715** 1.152 1.118 
 (0.532) (0.632) (0.657) (0.709) (0.872) (1.227) 
       
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,404 1,422 1,422 1,404 
R-squared 0.000 0.003 0.026 0.004 0.008 0.043 
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Table 7 
Regressions Explaining Volatility of Total Debt/Assets Ratio 
Between 2006 and 2016 
 
The dependent variable is capital structure volatility, as measured by the standard deviation of a company’s total 
debt/assets ratio between 2006 and 2016. Small Size is a dummy variable for companies in the lowest two deciles 
when ranked according to average total assets between 2006 and 2016, similar to Leary (2009). Total Assets is 
the average assets of companies between 2006 and 2016. Change in Assets is calculated as the assets in 2016 
minus assets in 2006, scaled by assets in 2006. Return on Assets is the average profit/assets ratio between 2006 
and 2016. Revenue Growth is the average annual sales growth of companies, expressed in percentages, between 
2006 and 2016. Dummy variables are created for firms which are classified as operating in the following ICB 
industries: Industrials, Utilities or Technology. Dummy variables are also created for companies domiciled in 
France, Germany, or the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), with UK being the base group. All 
data is obtained from Bloomberg. Significance at 1% is denoted by ***, 5% by **, and 10% by *. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Small Size 0.997***     0.137 
 (0.380)     (0.380) 
TotAssets  -0.000***    -0.000** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
ChangeAssets  0.079    0.159** 
  (0.066)    (0.070) 
ROA   -0.152***   -0.160*** 
   (0.027)   (0.029) 
SalesGrowth   0.008*   0.004 
   (0.004)   (0.005) 
Industrials    -0.388  -0.137 
    (0.270)  (0.256) 
Utilities    -1.302**  -1.182** 
    (0.554)  (0.491) 
Technology    -0.244  -0.227 
    (0.410)  (0.420) 
France     -1.335*** -1.147*** 
     (0.319) (0.316) 
Germany     -0.575 -0.262 
     (0.354) (0.343) 
PIIGS     0.027 0.057 
     (0.340) (0.330) 
Constant 6.003*** 6.207*** 6.434*** 6.386*** 6.576*** 6.746*** 
 (0.127) (0.160) (0.169) (0.178) (0.223) (0.298) 
       
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,404 1,422 1,422 1,404 
R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.070 0.003 0.013 0.092 
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Table 8 
Final Debt Ratios decomposed into Initial Debt and Changes in Debt 
 
Companies have been split into categories based on the overall change in their debt/asset ratios between 2006 and 2016. Companies which reduced their capital structures by 
15% or more are in the first group, those which reduced by 5% to 15% are in the second group (b), those which reduced or increased by less than 5% are in the third group (c), 
those which increased by 5% to 15% are in the fourth group (d), and those which increased by more than 15% are in the final group. For each group, the origin of assets in 
2016 is shown, by taking the value of debt, equity and other liabilities in 2006, and scaling them by the value of assets in 2016. The change in debt, equity and other liabilities 
between 2006 and 2016 is also shown, scaled by the value of assets in 2016. The change in debt is decomposed into debt flows, which is the sum of changes in debt shown on 
the cash flow statement from 2006 to 2016, and changes in debt which appear only on the balance sheet, which is defined as changes in the balance sheet value of debt minus 
the changes in debt shown on the cash flow statement. Each of these are also scaled by the value of assets in 2016. The initial debt ratio of companies in 2006 can be calculated 
as debt in 2006, divided by the sum of debt, equity and other liabilities in 2006. The final debt/assets ratio of companies in 2016 if there were zero debt flows, can be calculated 
as debt in 2006, plus the change in balance sheet only debt between 2006 and 2016, divided by total assets in 2016. The final debt/assets ratio of companies in 2016 can be 
calculated as debt in 2006, plus the change in balance sheet only debt between 2006 and 2016, plus debt flows from 2006 to 2016, divided by total assets in 2016. 
 
  Origins of Assets in 2016, by Asset Type   Debt Ratios  
Change in 
Debt/Assets 
Ratio between 
2006 and 2016 
 Debt 2006 
Change in 
Balance  
Sheet 
Only Debt 
2006-16 
Debt 
Flows 
2006-16 
Equity 
2006 
Change in 
Equity 
2006-16 
Other 
Liabilities 
2006 
Change in 
Other 
Liabilities 
2006-16 
 
Initial 
Debt/Assets 
 
Final Debt/Assets 
if zero 
Debt Flows 
Final Debt 
/ 
Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
(1) 
/ 
(1+4+6) 
(1+2) 
/ 
(1+2+3+4+5+6+7) 
(1+2+3) 
/ 
(1+2+3+4+5+6+7) 
             
Reductions  42.6% -13.6% -13.7% 30.1% 19.4% 31.3% 3.8%  42.9% 29.1% 15.4% 
b  26.9% -5.0% -3.5% 34.2% 10.9% 31.2% 5.2%  28.2% 21.9% 18.4% 
c  12.1% 1.4% 3.2% 40.9% 7.8% 28.0% 6.7%  16.7% 13.5% 16.7% 
d  11.1% 6.1% 8.7% 31.8% 8.7% 26.4% 7.2%  16.3% 17.2% 25.9% 
Increases  25.2% 6.0% 16.4% 45.0% -26.9% 35.4% -1.1%  15.7% 31.2% 47.5% 
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Table 9 
Sources and Uses of Cash Flows for Companies, 
grouped according to the average level of their Debt Flows 
 
The components of the cash flow statement were obtained for each company, for each year from 2006 to 2016, and scaled by total assets in each year, using data obtained from 
Bloomberg. Companies have been split into quintiles based on the average level of their debt flows, as a percentage of total assets, between 2006 and 2016. The average of the 
other components of the cash flow statement are reported for each of these quintiles. Cash from Operating and Investing Activities (CFOI) is the sum of the first two major 
sections of the cash flow statement. Equity Payouts is the sum of dividends, equity repurchases, issues and other financing arrangements. Surplus or Deficit is the sum of CFOI, 
Changes in Cash Balances, and Equity Payouts. The difference between the quintiles with the largest inflows and outflows is then calculated, and the significance of t-tests is 
reported. 
 
Average  
Debt Flows 
2006-2016 
Cash from 
Operations 
Change in 
Fixed and 
Intangible 
Assets 
Cash from 
Acquisitions 
and 
Divestitures 
Other 
Investments 
Cash from 
Operating 
and 
Investing 
Activities 
Change 
in Cash 
Balances 
Dividends Equity Repurchases 
Equity 
Issues 
Other 
Finance 
Equity  
Payouts 
Surplus or 
Deficit 
Debt 
Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5) 
=(1+2 
+3+4) 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(11) 
=(7+8+ 
9+10) 
(12) 
=(5+6+10) 
(13) 
 
Largest Outflows 6.0% -3.0% -0.1% -0.5% 2.3% -0.1% -1.4% -0.4% 1.9% 0.1% 0.1% 2.4% -2.4% 
p 6.2% -3.2% -0.3% -1.2% 1.4% -0.7% -2.0% -0.4% 2.1% 0.0% -0.3% 0.4% -0.4% 
q 5.2% -3.6% -0.2% -1.5% -0.1% -0.5% -1.8% -0.4% 2.6% -0.1% 0.3% -0.3% 0.3% 
r 7.0% -4.3% -0.6% -1.5% 0.6% -0.6% -2.0% -0.4% 1.4% -0.3% -1.3% -1.2% 1.2% 
Largest Inflows 5.9% -5.4% -0.7% -2.7% -3.0% -0.7% -1.8% -0.7% 2.9% -0.2% 0.2% -3.5% 3.5% 
              
Difference -0.1% -2.4%*** -0.6%*** -2.2%*** -5.3%*** -0.6%*** -0.3%* -0.3%** 1.0%** -0.3%* 0.1% -5.9%*** 5.9%*** 
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Table 10 
Standard Deviation of Sources and Uses of Cash Flows for Companies, 
grouped according to the Standard Deviation of their Debt Flows 
 
The components of the cash flow statement were obtained for each company, for each year from 2006 to 2016, and scaled by total assets in each year, using data obtained from 
Bloomberg. Companies have been split into quintiles based on the standard deviation of their debt flows, as a percentage of total assets, between 2006 and 2016. The standard 
deviation of the other components of the cash flow statement are reported for each of these quintiles. Cash from Operating and Investing Activities (CFOI) is the sum of the 
first two major sections of the cash flow statement. Equity Payouts is the sum of dividends, equity repurchases, issues and other financing arrangements. Surplus or Deficit is 
the sum of CFOI, Changes in Cash Balances, and Equity Payouts. The difference between the quintiles with the highest and lowest standard deviations is then calculated, and 
the significance of t-tests is reported. 
 
Standard Deviation 
of Debt Flows 
2006-2016 
 Cash from Operations 
Change in 
Fixed and 
Intangible 
Assets 
Cash from 
Acquisitions 
and 
Divestitures 
Other 
Investments 
Cash 
from 
Operating 
and 
Investing 
Activities 
Change 
in Cash 
Balances 
Dividends Equity Repurchases 
Equity 
Issues 
Other 
Finance 
Equity 
Payouts 
Surplus or 
Deficit 
Debt 
Flow 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Lowest  6.1% 2.0% 1.1% 4.7% 7.9% 8.3% 1.4% 0.6% 4.1% 2.1% 6.3% 1.1% 1.1% 
2  4.2% 2.2% 1.3% 3.0% 6.0% 4.8% 0.9% 0.6% 1.9% 2.0% 3.7% 3.1% 3.1% 
3  4.7% 2.5% 1.5% 4.1% 7.4% 5.5% 1.2% 0.7% 2.5% 2.5% 4.9% 4.7% 4.7% 
4  5.7% 2.9% 1.7% 5.2% 8.7% 6.4% 1.2% 0.9% 3.4% 2.3% 5.6% 6.6% 6.6% 
Highest  7.9% 4.5% 2.1% 7.9% 13.2% 8.3% 1.2% 1.1% 6.2% 3.2% 8.9% 11.7% 11.7% 
               
Difference  1.9%*** 2.5%*** 1.0%*** 3.2%*** 5.3%*** 0.0% -0.2% 0.5%*** 2.1%*** 1.1%*** 2.7%*** 10.6%*** 10.6%*** 
               
 
 
 
 
39 
	
Table 11 
Responsiveness of Debt Flows, Equity Payouts and Changes in Cash Balance  
to Cash Flow from Operating and Investing Activities, 
by Debt Volatility Quintiles 
 
The Debt Flows, Equity Payouts, and Changes in Cash Balances of each company, in each year, are regressed 
against the Cash from Operating and Investing Activities (CFOI) of that company, in that year. Debt Flows, Equity 
Payouts and Changes in Cash Balances are all multiplied by -1, to make the betas positive and more intuitive, 
with debt payouts, equity payouts, and increases in cash balances now appearing as being positive. All variables 
are scaled by total assets. Dummy variables are included for companies based on the standard deviation of their 
debt flows between 2006 and 2016. DummySDDebt5 are those companies with the highest volatility in their debt 
flows, DummySDDebt4 have the next highest volatility etc. These dummy variables are also interacted with 
CFOI. SmallSizeLag is a dummy variable for companies which had were in the lowest two deciles when ranked 
by total assets in the previous year. HighDebtLag is a dummy variable for companies which were in the highest 
two deciles when ranked by debt/assets in the previous year. LowDebtLag is a dummy variable for companies 
which were in the lowest two deciles when ranked by debt/assets in the previous year. NoDividendLag is a dummy 
variable for companies which did not pay a dividend in the previous year. NoRepurchasesLag is a dummy variable 
for companies which did not make repurchases in the previous year. Significance at 1% is denoted by ***, 5% by 
**, and 10% by *. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Debt 
Flows 
Equity 
Payouts 
Change in 
Cash Balances 
    
CFOI 0.037*** 0.517*** 0.446*** 
 (0.003) (0.033) (0.034) 
CFOI*DummySDDebt2 0.109*** -0.086* -0.023 
 (0.012) (0.047) (0.048) 
CFOI*DummySDDebt3 0.173*** -0.061 -0.112** 
 (0.014) (0.046) (0.045) 
CFOI* DummySDDebt4 0.248*** -0.109** -0.140*** 
 (0.016) (0.044) (0.042) 
CFOI* DummySDDebt5 0.371*** -0.171*** -0.200*** 
 (0.023) (0.042) (0.043) 
DummySDDebt2 -0.006*** 0.007*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
DummySDDebt3 -0.009*** 0.011*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
DummySDDebt4 -0.010*** 0.007*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
DummySDDebt5 -0.009*** 0.007** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
SmallSizeLag -0.004*** 0.005*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HighDebtLag 0.010*** -0.008*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
LowDebtLag -0.005*** 0.005** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
NoDividendLag 0.020*** -0.034*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
NoRepurchasesLag 0.006*** -0.013*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.007*** 0.016*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Observations 14,220 14,220 14,220 
R-squared 0.283 0.347 0.209 
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Table 12 
Decomposition of Variance in Changes in Debt 
into Variance and Covariances of other Cash Flow Components 
 
Companies have been split into quintiles based on the variance of their debt flows, as a percentage of total assets, between 2006 and 2016. The variance and covariances of 
cash flow variables for each company between 2006 and 2016 are also calculated. Var(dDebt) is the variance of the flows of debt, Var(CFOI) is the variance of Cash from 
Operating and Investing activities, Var(dCash) is the variance of the change in cash holdings, and Var(EqPay) is the variance of equity pay-outs. Cov(CFOI, dCash) is the 
covariance of CFOI and cash holdings, Cov(CFOI, EqPay) is the covariance of CFOI and equity payouts, and Cov(dCash, EqPay) is the covariance of cash holdings and equity 
payouts. The average variance and covariance of each component for companies within each quintile is then calculated. The difference between the quintiles with the highest 
and lowest variance in debt flows is then calculated, and the significance of t-tests is reported. 
Variance 
of Debt Flows 
2006-2016 
Var(CFOI) Var(EqPay) Var(dCash) 2 * Cov(CFOI, EqPay) 2 * Cov(CFOI, dCash) 2 * Cov(EqPay, dCash)  Sum  Var(dDebt) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  =(1+2+3 +4+5+6)   
           
Lowest 1.0% 0.9% 1.3% -0.6% -1.4% -1.2%  0.0%  0.0% 
2 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% -0.3% -0.5% -0.2%  0.1%  0.1% 
3 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% -0.5% -0.6% -0.4%  0.2%  0.2% 
4 0.9% 0.6% 0.7% -0.4% -0.7% -0.6%  0.4%  0.4% 
Highest 2.2% 1.3% 1.1% -1.0% -1.1% -1.0%  1.5%  1.5% 
           
Difference 1.1%*** 0.4%** -0.2% -0.3%** 0.3% 0.3%  1.5%***  1.5%*** 
 
 
